Waived, not repealed: what the US Graham Act order changes for oil buyers and sellers, and what it does not

The Act was signed into law on 18 September 2026. Most of its measures had to be put in place within 30 days, which is why the order arrived on 16 October.

The order does three things that matter for oil trade:

It sets duties on paper. Section 2 raises duties on goods from Russia by 500%, and by 100% on goods from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas if those countries knowingly make new purchases on or after 18 October 2026. A further 100% applies to the five countries judged to be the leading facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion.

It waives them. Section 4 waives those duties and a long list of the Act's sanctions provisions (sections 102(a), 102(d), 102(e), 103 to 111 and 117). Law firm summaries describe the waived areas as including energy-related activity, Russian financial institutions, investment, sovereign debt and financial messaging.

It keeps the switch within reach. The waivers have no end date. They stay in place "until such time as" the President or the Secretary of State decides further action is appropriate. Meanwhile the US Trade Representative must monitor countries' purchases of Russian crude and gas and report regularly, including on circumstances that might justify changing the waivers.

The order also states that nothing in it affects sanctions under the executive orders already in force for the Russia national emergency. Those remain. Executive Order 14066, for example, still prohibits US imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products, subject to licences. The separate OFAC General License 135, issued on 9 October, still authorises certain transactions in Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027.

In short: no new US measure in this order bites today, but a monitoring process is now running against a purchase date that has already passed.

A waiver that can be ended by executive decision is a contingent risk, not a closed one. Three features make it worth tracking.

The reference date is fixed. The 100% duty on major importers is tied to purchases on or after 18 October 2026. If the waiver were lifted later, purchases already made would be part of the record USTR has been told to monitor. How any future decision would treat past purchases is not stated; that is exactly why it belongs in contract risk, not in the "resolved" column.

The target is the country, not the cargo. The tariff mechanism applies to goods exported to the United States from the buying country. It would not stop a cargo of Russian crude discharging in India or China. It would hit that country's wider exports, including any refined products sent to the US. That is a political and macroeconomic risk for buyers in those countries, and a commercial risk for anyone selling products from those refineries into US markets. India has already warned Washington that the tariffs could affect bilateral ties, and China has restated its opposition to what it calls long-arm jurisdiction.

The politics are live. Reuters reporting notes that the measures could have pushed oil prices higher weeks before the 3 November US midterm elections. A waiver granted partly for price reasons can be reconsidered when those reasons change.

While the US eased one set of measures, the EU and UK continued to add to theirs. For any trade with a European nexus, these are the rules that apply now.

EU, 15 October 2026. The Council listed three individuals and nine entities for circumventing EU sanctions. Four are oil or shipping related: HURUS TRADE FZE, described as a trading intermediary supplying Russian-origin crude to India; DIS Logistics DMCC; Vigor Marine Services LLP; and Shiva Shipping Ltd, all described as part of the shadow fleet ecosystem. Listed parties are subject to an asset freeze, and making funds or economic resources available to them is prohibited.

EU, 21st package (23 July 2026). It listed 41 more vessels on top of 632 already sanctioned, extended measures to vessels that service the shadow fleet, and created a basis to ban transactions with refineries in Russia and third countries that process Russian crude. A transaction ban on a refinery at Kulevi, Georgia, takes effect six months after adoption. The package also paused the automatic adjustment of the EU oil price cap until 15 July 2027.

UK, 8 October 2026. The UK sanctioned Zarubezhneft and INK Capital and 12 more tankers. The government says UK sanctions now cover over 90% of Russia's oil production capacity and more than 600 tankers.

The US has also been tightening on Iran. The State Department and Treasury designated entities, individuals and vessels in Iran's oil trade on 8 October, and OFAC designated a further 16 individuals and 10 entities in Iran's financial networks on 15 October.

So the regulatory picture for a single cargo now depends heavily on who is involved and where. A US waiver does not change what an EU bank, a UK insurer or a European charterer may do.

The same week brought a third kind of headline. On 14 October Reuters reported, citing a US official, that the administration was considering easing sanctions on some shadow fleet vessels so they could carry oil that is not itself sanctioned, with the aim of lowering record freight rates. On 20 October Energy Secretary Chris Wright described an approval process under development for formerly sanctioned tankers to trade under recognised owners, carrying only non-sanctioned oil. He said this was not a blanket lifting of sanctions on Iranian or Russian oil. No licence had been reported as issued at the time of writing.

Analysts quoted by Splash247 put the number of vessels that could realistically return at roughly 19 to 24 VLCCs. INTERTANKO warned that legalising a vessel does not resolve questions about its condition, ownership or insurance.

For buyers and sellers, the practical point is simple. Until a licence exists and its terms are published, nothing about a sanctioned vessel's status has changed. Even if one is issued, a vessel cleared by the US may remain designated by the EU or UK.

Suppose that in December a Mediterranean refiner is offered a cargo of Brazilian crude, priced competitively because the seller has secured a VLCC at below-market freight. The vessel was designated by OFAC in 2025, and the seller says it has since been approved under a new US scheme for formerly sanctioned tankers.

The refiner's checks might go like this:

Is there a published US licence or authorisation, and does this vessel, under this owner, meet its conditions? Ask for the document, not a summary.

Is the vessel, identified by IMO number, on the EU or UK lists? In this example, assume it remains specified by the UK. Any UK-insured party, UK bank or UK-incorporated affiliate would then face restrictions in dealing with it.

Will the refiner's own P&I club, terminal and financing bank accept the vessel? A US approval does not bind any of them.

Who carries the risk if the vessel is refused at the discharge port? That should be written into the contract before nomination, not argued over after.

The cheap freight may be real. The question is whether the refiner can lawfully and practically take delivery, and who pays if it cannot.

1. Sort every measure by status. Keep a simple table for each programme that touches your trade: in force; authorised by licence (with expiry date); waived but revocable; announced or under consideration. Only the first two change what you can do today. The last two change what you should plan for.

2. Do not price a waiver as permanent. For term contracts or deals that settle after the next few months, check that your sanctions and change-of-law clauses cover the reinstatement of a waived measure, not only new designations. Agree who bears re-routing, delay and termination costs if a counterparty, vessel or destination becomes restricted mid-contract.

3. Screen the whole chain against every relevant list. That means OFAC, the EU consolidated list and the UK Sanctions List, for every buyer, seller, intermediary, shipowner, manager and vessel. The 15 October EU listings show that trading intermediaries and ship managers in third countries are a direct target.

4. Identify vessels by IMO number. List entries change. A UK notice of 2 October 2026 shows two ships removed from the list and re-specified the next day under new list IDs. Screening by name or list ID alone can miss this.

5. Watch dates that are already on the calendar. Examples: 7 April 2027 (expiry of OFAC GL 135 on Russian diesel), the six-month start of the EU Kulevi transaction ban, and 15 July 2027 (end of the EU pause on automatic price cap adjustment). Each could change who can buy what.

6. Ask counsel the jurisdiction question early. Where any party, bank, insurer or vessel has a US, EU or UK nexus, take advice on how each regime applies before terms are agreed. This article is not a substitute for that.

The waivers may simply stay. If the administration's priority remains lower energy prices, the waivers could last indefinitely and the contingent risk may never crystallise.

Policy could converge. A diplomatic settlement involving Russia, or a change in EU or UK policy, could narrow the gap between regimes and reduce the screening burden.

The shadow fleet scheme may be small or may not happen. Analyst estimates suggest only a few dozen large tankers would qualify, so its effect on freight and on vessel risk may be marginal.

Hormuz could change the motive. If Gulf flows normalise and freight rates fall, the price-driven case for US easing weakens, which could push policy in either direction.

Legal reading. We have not mapped every waived section of the Act to its subject matter. Some provisions on vessels, insurers or port operators may or may not fall within the waiver; specialist advice should confirm this for any specific trade.

The 16 October order changed the US position on paper more than in practice. Duties and sanctions were written down and switched off in the same document, with a monitoring process left running. Meanwhile the EU and UK keep adding names, vessels and refineries. Buyers and sellers should classify each measure by its real status, write reinstatement risk into contracts, and screen every party and vessel against all three regimes before a cargo is fixed.